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The preliminary reference procedure found in Article 234 EC provides that the task of ensuring Community law is respected in the Member States is shared between the European Court of Justice and national courts. The national courts send questions of interpretation of the Treaties and associated legislation to the ECJ, and then apply the answers that they receive to the cases before them.
Unfortunately, this procedure is in severe difficulties. The time taken to answer references is approaching two years, and it is accepted that it is likely to rise further. Enlargement may lead to an extra dramatic growth, as new courts, unfamiliar with Community law, increase the number and diversity of references. 
This puts the effectiveness of Community law in jeopardy, partly by preventing the timely use of the correct principles of law in national courts, but also by strongly discouraging national courts from referring questions at all. Given the enormous extra time and cost that references add to the case, it is understandable that national judges are sometimes reluctant to refer. This raises the risk of non-uniformity of Community law, as judges in at least some Member States increasingly prefer to rely on their own interpretations, rather than seeking them from the ECJ. 
As a result, reform has been considered an urgent priority for some years now. However, proposals have focussed almost exclusively on improving the institutional structure and operation of the Community courts – more money, more judges, less judges per case, specialized chambers, and so on. This paper suggests that this strategy is unlikely to be successful (and indeed, until now, despite some of these reforms being implemented, there has not been any dent in the growing delays). The problem is not located in the organisation of the Community court system, but rather in the relationship between the two levels of courts, and in the way that the ECJ manages that relationship. It is this that needs to be reformed.
The problem lies in the way the ECJ understands the division of functions between national and Community courts, and in particular the distinction between ‘interpretation’ (for the ECJ) and ‘application’ (for the national court). Essentially, it tends to treat– albeit with occasional deviations from this view - every application of a Community rule as involving a new interpretation.​[1]​ 
This approach is understandable. As a matter of principle, it can be argued that each application of a rule fleshes out its meaning and so in a sense ‘interprets’ it. More importantly, the ECJ’s approach gives it a deep involvement in the national caseload, and enables it to steer the use and development of Community law. This prevents divergent understandings of the law from arising. It can also be useful for national judges, who may value clear and concrete guidance with deciding their case, and will not appreciate being told that it raises no new interpretative issues, and so they should just apply existing case law. They want an answer.
However, there are considerable disadvantages to the ECJ’s approach. It potentially results in an unmanageable workload, and it alienates and infantilises the national legal system. The workload problem arises because if each application is an interpretation then the ECJ will potentially receive references in all national cases involving Community law. They all become suitable for reference. This is clearly, even with the most well-funded and efficient Community court system an unsustainable position. The infantilisation occurs because in any case involving Community law the national judge is reduced to mechanically applying the answer she receives from the ECJ. It is as if the national judiciary has no intelligent role to play in Community law. Clearly, this will not help with the long-term integration of Community rules into the national legal system.
In short, the ECJ’s approach is a centralising one, in which it maintains a very broad interpretative monopoly. This has enabled it to exert a powerful influence on the EU’s legal development, but it cannot represent a viable approach indefinitely. At some point it must re-interpret its relationship with the national courts to give them a more autonomous and contributory role.
This can be partly achieved by interpreting ‘interpretation’ more narrowly, so that a new interpretation arises only where a genuinely analytically new point is raised. Then in most cases the national courts can just apply existing principles to the facts before them. Centralisation would be reduced. However, another approach may be, paradoxically, to move towards more hierarchy. At the moment, the relationship between national and Community courts is formally one of co-operation. However, in practice, this means that where Community law is relevant the national courts are entirely sidelined, except as enforcers of the ECJ’s word. By contrast, were the reference procedure to be replaced by an appeal on cassation to the ECJ, then there would be a greater role for national courts to provide their own complete interpretations of Community rules, with the possibility for the ECJ to supervise these on cassation, in order to maintain uniformity. As a genuine supreme court of Community law, the ECJ would lose no status or power, but would be less taxed by a need to interpret every single mundane case.
	This paper follows the above argument. The following section outlines the way that the Court understands the division of functions between it and national courts, and why it does so. Subsequent sections then consider the major problems arising from the Court’s approach. Finally, an alternative, cassation, is considered.

2. Interpretation and application

The Treaty provides that where national judges are faced with a case in which it is necessary for a question of Community law to be answered they may refer that question to the Court of Justice.​[2]​ If they are the final court, beyond which no appeal in the case is possible, then they must do so – subject to very narrow exceptions.​[3]​ The national court is then obliged to apply the answer that it receives to the case before it.
	The Court of Justice emphasises the labour-sharing character of this process, rather than any element of hierarchy. While it is true that it has the last word on the Community law point, by contrast, it has no competence or jurisdiction to interpret the national laws involved in the case, nor to apply the Community law to the facts.​[4]​ These functions are exclusively for national courts. By working together, national and Community judges provide the pieces necessary to solve the case.
	The conventional description of the division of functions is that the Court of Justice interprets Community law, and the national judge applies that interpretation. However, while clear at first glance, it is apparent upon consideration that the line between these two functions is far from clear. Examples are the best way of illustrating this.
	In one of the most famous – and important – Community law cases, Cassis de Dijon,​[5]​ the referring German Court asked whether a German rule requiring fruit wine sold in Germany to have a minimum alcohol content was a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports, contrary to Article 28. The question was raised because French Cassis typically had a lower percentage of alcohol, and the German rule therefore prevented it from being imported and sold in Germany.
	The Court of Justice found that such a national product standard would indeed be prohibited unless it was necessary to protect some important public interest, such as consumer protection. The important part of this, which has been the core of free movement law and of the internal market ever since, was the requirement of necessity, which is part of the principle of proportionality. The Court was deciding that product standards must be proportionate, if they were to be enforceable against imports.
	The Court then went on to decide that the German rule was disproportionate, because although it aimed to protect the consumer, which was legitimate, that aim could be achieved by less burdensome means, such as a labelling requirement. In deciding this, was the Court interpreting Community law, or in reality applying to the facts?
	One view is that the question whether a given rule is in fact necessary to achieve its ends is part of what interpretation is. Each fact set raises a new question, and each ratio decidendi is a new interpretation. Interpretation, on this view, is something that is done through application, through considering specific instances. This might be called a very common law view. It has the advantage of practicality – clearly it is through use of a rule in particular situations that one understands what it really means. However, it has the disadvantage that it renders the Court’s distinction between interpretation and application nugatory.
	A different view is that the Court began by interpreting the law on goods. Its finding that the application of national product standards to imports was only permissible if the standards were proportionate was a true interpretation of Article 28 EC. However, in then examining whether the German rule was in fact necessary, and in reaching the conclusion that labels would protect consumers just as well, it was delving into facts, drawing conclusions about them, and essentially applying its interpretation to the case – that is to say, transgressing the boundary to its competences which it had laid down itself.
	The Court is variable. Often it pronounces that whether a particular rule is proportionate is a matter for the national court. However, more often it essentially decides such questions itself.​[6]​ Not only does it do this where proportionality is in issue – which arises in free movement, sex discrimination, and other contexts - but with other principles too. When is a violation of Community law by a Member State ‘sufficiently serious’ to incur liability? When does interpretation of a particular national rule to comply with an unimplemented directive go beyond the compulsory ‘so far as possible’ test? 
	What all of these have in common is that they are ‘mixed’ principles, whose use and meaning involves both law and fact. An interpretation of them out of context has only limited explanatory power. Hence the Court dives into the facts – unless of course it is one of those complicated or politically sensitive cases where it chooses not to and refers to the division of functions between courts to explain this.​[7]​
	This gives a clue to the main reason why the Court takes the approach it does. It wishes to provide maximum assistance to national judges – who often ask very concrete questions, and so perhaps expect concrete answers – and it wants to provide answers that make sure that the national judge cannot subsequently get it wrong. Merely handing down abstract principles to be applied would still leave room for a great deal of delinquency and divergence. What one judge may find to be necessary and proportionate to protect consumers, another may not. The Court of Justice is keeping control in the interests of the uniformity of Community law.​[8]​
	However, there is another approach possible. A greater degree of control over outcomes could also be reached through more detailed and precise abstract principles, and more explanation of the procedural steps that a national judge must follow. In Cassis the Court could have explained the steps involved in assessing proportionality, and how the relevant interests which may arise should be balanced against each other. This would both assist the national judges in applying the Community law principles, and limit their capacity for highly divergent applications.​[9]​ It is notable that the Court does not generally provide such explanations. While there is some expansion of what is ‘sufficiently serious’ to be found in the case law, one may search in vain for a thorough and useful explanation of how a national judge should apply proportionality.




On a narrow view of interpretation, there will probably never again be a need to refer a case concerning free movement law. The principles are now quite clear. All national standards must be justified and proportionate, and there are a few other rules as well, but essentially the law is in place. It just remains to apply it to the situations which occur.
	On the view which the Court seems to take, the position is dramatically different. Every new fact set requires a new interpretation, and therefore justifies a reference. Potentially, almost every case in a national court where Community law is involved may generate a question for Luxembourg.​[10]​ Only where the Court has already pronounced on identical facts or where the answer is so dazzlingly obvious that there is in fact nothing to seriously think about – rather narrow limitations – is this not the case.​[11]​ Certainly, every case where a ‘mixed norm’ is involved is appropriate for the Court of Justice, but these are famously ubiquitous in Community law.
	It is clear that no institutional reform will ever create a Court of Justice capable of dealing with references from every national case involving Community law. It must therefore hope that national judges exercise their discretion not to refer – and the increasing slowness of answering questions is no doubt an effective deterrent here – or it must change its approach to its own function. Since it shows no sign of doing the latter, the future of the Community judicial system currently rests on the former. This hardly seems desirable.

4. Infantilising Supreme Courts

A peculiarity of the reference procedure is that while lower judges may refer questions, final judges must. Unlike their lower brethren, supreme courts are prohibited in all circumstances from deciding any question of Community law themselves. Even the narrow CILFIT exceptions do not change this, since these may be understood as describing circumstances where there is really nothing to decide.
	The reason for this rule is clear and understandable. While if lower judges decide the law themselves and get it wrong there is still room for appeal, if the final court is allowed to decide Community law points, and it gets them wrong, then incorrect interpretations of Community law will be entrenched in national systems. Final courts are too powerful to be allowed to play freely, and so they must automatically refer all the Community law questions which are necessary for the cases before them.
	This must be frustrating for senior judges, the cream of their national profession. They will never, for the rest of their career, be permitted to think intelligently about any question of Community law, at least within the context of their work. However, this is mitigated somewhat if interpretation is interpreted narrowly. Then at least they can decide whether a measure is proportionate, sufficiently serious, and so on. Unfortunately, since the Court of Justice regularly answers such questions they are clearly within its jurisdiction, and so must also be referred. Matters of Community law should, if national courts obey the Court of Justice and the Treaty, simply slip through the supreme courts without touching the sides.
	It is difficult to imagine national supreme courts accepting this humiliation, particularly in a time when references take so long. Nor is it good for Community law itself. If this is to become properly integrated into national legal systems, and properly used by national judges, then supreme courts clearly have an important role to play. Within the nation they have more authority and day-to-day influence than the Court of Justice, and are well-placed to create a culture of good use of Community law, either through example or pronouncement. Unfortunately not only is this role blocked by the simple fact that they are not allowed to use that law themselves, but any motivation they may have to encourage its integration by other means must be significantly reduced.
	In fact there seems to be evidence that supreme courts are rebelling against the Court of Justice, and refusing to refer when they are in fact obliged to. This is of two sorts – on the one hand, anecdotal evidence from practicing lawyers and judges is that in several Member States, including the Netherlands and the UK, there have been cases where Community law points were not referred to the Court of Justice but should have been. This should be straightforward to empirically establish, and its extent, and would be a worthwhile research project, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Secondly, a recent case against Italy, brought by the Commission, as a result of the failure of its judges to refer,​[12]​ and the famous Köbler case,​[13]​ in which the Court of Justice outlined that such failure may occur state liability, suggest that there is an awareness within Community institutions that delinquent supreme courts are an increasing threat to the integrity and function of Community law. These two cases seem to suggest the emergence of a policy to enforce the obligation to refer, presumably based on an awareness of growing failure to do so. On reason for this divergence between supreme courts and Community law must be the infantilising approach taken to them by the Court of Justice.
	Perhaps more alarming still is the question of pure principle. Supreme courts have largely accepted that in principle they are obliged to obey the Treaty and the Court of Justice. In not doing so they are setting aside the law for reasons of mixed practicality and pride. It is very worrying when a dysfunctional system reaches the point that it causes the highest judges in a country to deliberately disobey the law. The respect of the population for the legal system and the popular assumption that judges may be trusted in their function are both called into question.

5. The confusion of lower courts

One of the claims most often made in defence of the Court’s concrete answers is that this is just a reaction to the way that national judges ask their questions, and that they expect an answer to these. If they ask whether a national rule is disproportionate, they will be unhappy if they are not told.
	This is a very weak defence. There is no doubt that the Court of Justice is responsible for interpreting the scope and nature of the preliminary reference system, and if national judges have the idea that they may or should refer questions of proportionality then this is because the Court has always treated such questions as appropriate and answered them, and so given the impression that they are indeed ones of interpretation. The corollary is that if the Court were to indicate to national judges that they should apply proportionality themselves, instead of asking it to do so, they would presumably take this advice and reduce the number of references. The argument that the nature of answers is led by the nature of the questions is an abdication of responsibility. The questions are part of the procedure too, and so it is for the Court to indicate what sorts of questions should be sent.
	At the moment the Court sends wildly mixed messages. For the hard-headed national judge who has no desire to refer support can be found in the cases stating that only a national judge can assess a national rule. For the nervous judge who is inclined towards ‘if in doubt, ask’ there are also the majority of cases where the court embraces application. How can a poor national judge who is neither nervous nor stubborn but simply wishes to do the legally correct thing be expected to find his way? 
	It is very likely that one reaction of national judges will be irritation, and a tendency to rebel. Co-operation with the Court of Justice and use of Community law in national courts are both hindered if national judges perceive these to involve imprecise and unprincipled decision-making. Perhaps even worse, from the Community law perspective at least, is that reactions are likely to vary considerably, both from judge to judge and from land to land. Whereas the judicial culture of one land may lead judges to tend to go for non-referral, in another land the culture may be more deferential and referral rates may be much higher.​[14]​ Since there is evidence that the Court of Justice does not always take the same view of proportionality as national judges do,​[15]​ which court makes the decision affects the substantive outcome of the case. Thus differences in referral rates will lead to non-uniformity of Community law. Avoiding such non-uniformity is one of the major reasons why the reference procedure exists.
	Moreover, such diversity will not be easy to see. To know whether Community law is really going off the rails and being misapplied or not applied in national courts, which simply fail to refer questions involving mixed norms, will require national research on this question. While that is no doubt being done to some extent, it will be a significant challenge for the central Community authorities to monitor what is going on. One has to ask whether perhaps there is a better way, which avoids these problems in the first place.

6. A possible solution

The founding myth of the preliminary reference procedure is that there is no hierarchy involved. Of course in reality, on the point of Community law, there is a clear and absolute hierarchy. There may be co-operation in reaching a result in the case, but not in interpreting the Treaty and secondary legislation.
	Why not then move to a system of cassation, whereby national judges, even final judges, would decide the interpretation of Community law themselves but parties could appeal to the Court of Justice on the grounds that Community law had been misinterpreted? This would refer the case back to the national court for redecision if this was so. This would enable national judges of all levels to use Community law fully, to integrate it into their thinking and judging,​[16]​ while still enabling the possibility of control of uniformity. If there was a right to appeal, then there would also be less problems resulting from a national judicial refusal to play the game.
	Appeal could be possible from any level, or only from final courts – encouraging higher national courts to supervise the interpretation of Community law by lower ones. The disadvantage of this latter would be that it would create a long chain of appeals before a case was finally settled. However, that is true already, where a litigant may go to the Supreme Court and then have to wait for a reference.
	Perhaps appeals would result in more cases, and so a greater workload. However, if appeal was only from a final court then this would not be so, yet the conventional hierarchical structure would train and discipline lower judges so that a consistent approach to using the law was present throughout the system; indeed, Community law would be using the approach and mechanism for consistency that national legal systems use, a hierarchy of appeals.
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